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In this paper, we quantitatively assess the welfare implications of alternative public education 
spending rules. To this end, we employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in 
which human capital externalities and public education expenditures, financed by distorting 
taxes, enhance the productivity of private education choices. We allow public education 
spending, as share of output, to respond to various aggregate indicators in an attempt to 
minimize the market imperfection due to human capital externalities. We also expose the 
economy to varying degrees of uncertainty via changes in the variance of total factor 
productivity shocks. Our results indicate that, in the face of increasing aggregate uncertainty, 
active policy can significantly outperform passive policy (i.e. maintaining a constant public 
education to output ratio) but only when the policy instrument is successful in smoothing the 
growth rate of human capital. 
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Dezember 19, 2008 1 Introduction
Public education spending on, for example, schools, libraries and state uni-
versities, is an economic and political reality in all countries. The overall
public education shares of GDP and of total government spending can vary
quite considerably. For example, in 2005, the World Bank reported public
education spending shares of GDP and of total public spending respectively
of (5.9, 15.2) for the U.S.; (4.7, 9.7) for Germany; (3.7, 10.7) for Japan;
and (5.5, 11.9) for the U.K.. One of the most important economic justi￿ca-
tions for public education spending, irrespective of its relative size, is that
human capital creates externalities. In other words, one agent￿ s return to
human capital is positively a⁄ected by the human capital of other agents in
the society. Hence, decentralized decision-making leads to a growth rate of
human capital that is ine¢ ciently low (see e.g. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988),
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Tamura (1991)). The importance of ex-
ternalities in this context is emphasized by Lucas (2002) who states that "if
ideas are the engine of growth and if an excess of social over private returns
is an essential feature of the production of ideas, then we want to go out
of our way to introduce external e⁄ects into growth theory, not to try to do
without them￿and ￿the existence of important external e⁄ects of investment
in human capital ￿in knowledge ￿has long been viewed as an evident and
important aspect of reality￿ .1
The quantitative role of public education expenditure in generating en-
dogenous growth and improving social welfare remains an open issue. Al-
though there is a growing theoretical literature (see e.g. Glomm and Raviku-
mar (1992), Zhang (1996), Blankenau and Simpson (2004), Su (2004), and
Blankenau (2005)), we are not aware of any estimation or calibration research
which explores the empirical link between public education expenditure and
social welfare in a general equilibrium micro-founded setup.2
In this context, a number of relevant macro-oriented policy questions
can be addressed. For example, should the output share of public educa-
tion expenditure be held constant over time, or should policymakers follow a
state-dependent rule relating this share to the degree of market imperfection
resulting from the presence of externalities? If the latter, what indicator(s)
should the state-dependent policy rule respond to? What is the optimal re-
action of the public education share to the observed value of the indicator(s)?
With the answers to these in hand, it is then possible to establish the quan-
titative welfare gains/losses of moving from a constant to a state-dependent
1For further discussion and examples of externalities, see e.g. McMahon (2007) and
van der Ploeg and Veugelers (2008, pp. 111-2).
2An exception here is our recent research on this topic (see Angelopoulos, et al. (2008)).
2education spending share under various assumptions regarding the degree of
uncertainty present in the economy. In light of the current global economics
crisis, being able to address issues pertaining to uncertainty is particularly
useful.
In an attempt to provide answers to the above questions, we calibrate,
solve and conduct policy analysis using a simple dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model whose engine of long-term growth is human
capital accumulation. Human capital externalities and public education ex-
penditures can both enhance the productivity of private education choices.
The way we model human capital externalities follows Azariadis and Drazen
(1990) and Tamura (1991), while the way we model public education ex-
penditure is based on e.g. Blankenau and Simpson (2004), Su (2004) and
Blankenau (2005). To be in a position to realistically assess the e⁄ects of
public education expenditure, we assume that it is ￿nanced by a distorting
tax on income.
In contrast to the rest of the literature however, when modelling public
education spending, we allow its share in output to respond endogenously
to the gap between one of the model￿ s state variables and its corresponding
social planner￿ s value, where the latter serves as a benchmark or target. This
re￿ ects the idea that, in the presence of positive externalities from aggregate
human capital, market outcomes are ine¢ cient, and that such a gap serves
as an indicator of the extent of the underlying market ine¢ ciency. Note that
this is similar in approach to the monetary and ￿scal stabilization policy
literature (see, e.g. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007)). However, in contrast,
here the ￿scal stance reacts to a measure of resource misallocation, rather
than to a measure of cyclical conditions. As far as we know, there have not
been any other studies adopting this approach.
We experiment with a number of di⁄erent simple feedback policy rules/
gaps. In each case, the feedback policy coe¢ cient on the gap is chosen op-
timally so as to maximize household￿ s welfare. When policy makers do not
react to the state-dependent part of the rule, they follow a simple passive
policy by keeping the public education share constant over time. To solve the
model and welfare evaluate di⁄erent policies under uncertainty, we work as
in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004, 2007) by approximating both the equilib-
rium solution and welfare (de￿ned as household￿ s expected lifetime utility)
to second-order.
Our empirical base of departure for our model calibration is the post-war
U.S. economy. Our calibration pro￿ts signi￿cantly from having access to a
dataset which includes consistent measures for human and physical capital
(see e.g. Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989)). In contrast to the relevant em-
pirical studies referred to above, this data allows us to correctly distinguish
3between inputs to and output from the human capital production function.3
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. First, our model economy for the post-
war U.S. is consistent with positive externalities from economy-wide private
human capital and public education expenditure. Second, for low levels of
uncertainty, welfare gains can be realized for active versus passive policy ir-
respective of the rule. However, for relatively high levels of uncertainty, some
forms of active, state-dependent policy become counter-productive vis-a-vis
passive policy. Thus, ￿scal action comes at a cost. Changes in public educa-
tion spending trigger changes in income taxes that disrupt private decisions
and can destabilize the economy at high levels of uncertainty. Third, re-
action to the gap between the growth rate of human capital and its social
planner value (what we call the ￿ gap rule) welfare dominates any other sim-
ple state-dependent rule, as well as passive policy. Fourth, when we use the
￿ gap rule, the attractiveness of active versus passive policy is increasing in
the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty; also, counter-cyclical spending on
public education is welfare improving in this case, even if it requires higher
distorting tax rates in bad times. Fifth, when we calculate welfare for the
U.S., over the whole period 1981-2004 as well as over selected sub-periods,
we ￿nd that substantial welfare gains could have been realized under the ￿
gap rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data, calibration and long-run
solution. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 the conclusions. Finally,
the Appendix presents the derivation of welfare, the social planner￿ s solution
and Figures containing the model￿ s impulse response functions.
2 Theoretical model
We consider the implications of public education expenditure in a DSGE
model in which the engine of endogenous, long-term growth is human capital
accumulation. We allow for positive externalities generated by the average
stock of human capital in the society. These externalities can in turn justify
public expenditure on education.
3Given the lack of comparable cross-country human capital data, other empirical work
generally resorts to the use of measures of school enrolment ratios or years of schooling as
general proxies of labor quality or human capital.
42.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households indexed
by the superscript h and an equal number of identical ￿rms indexed by the
superscript f, where h;f = 1;2;:::;Nt. The population size, Nt, evolves at a
constant rate n ￿ 1, so that Nt+1 = nNt where N0 is given. Each household￿ s










where E0 is the conditional expectations operator, Ch
t is consumption of
household h at time t, lh
t is h￿ s leisure at t; and 0 < ￿ < 1 is the subjective




is increasing in all its arguments, concave and satis￿es the Inada conditions.









where, 1=￿ (￿ > 1) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption in adjacent periods and 0 < ￿ < 1 is the weight given to
consumption relative to leisure.
Each household h consumes Ch
t , invests Xh
t in the production of its own
human capital and saves Ih
t in physical capital. It receives interest income,
rtKh
t , where rt is the return to capital and Kh
t is the beginning-of-period
physical capital stock. Each household also has one unit of time in each
period t, which it allocates to leisure, lh
t , work, uh









t , where wt is the wage rate and uh
tHh
t is e⁄ective
labour. Finally, each h receives dividends paid by ￿rms, ￿h
t, and an average
lump-sum transfer/tax, G
o



















where 0 < ￿t < 1 is the distortionary income tax rate.
Each household￿ s physical and human evolve according to:
K
h
























￿1￿￿1￿￿2 e Bt (5)
5where, 0 ￿ ￿
p;￿
h ￿ 1 are depreciation rates on physical and human capital
respectively. The second term on the r.h.s. of (5), can be interpreted as
the quantity of ￿new￿human capital created at time t. This expression is
comprised of the following arguments: (i) eh
tHh
t ; which is h0s e⁄ective human
capital; (ii) Xh
t , which is h0s private expenditure on education; (iii) Ht;
which is the average human capital stock in the economy; and (iv) e Bt ￿
B (ge
t)
￿3, where B > 0 is a constant scale parameter and ge
t is average public
education expenditure expressed in e¢ ciency units (see below for further
detail). Finally, 0 < ￿1 < 1; 0 < 0 < ￿2 < 1 and 0 ￿ ￿3 < 1 are constant
parameters.4
The assumption that individual human capital accumulation is an in-
creasing function of the per capita level of economy-wide human capital, Ht,
encapsulates the idea that the existing know-how of the economy provides
an external positive e⁄ect. Equivalently, it can be thought of as a learning-
by-doing e⁄ect, as discussed in Romer (1986). Or, it can be interpreted more
generally, e.g. Hanushek (2002, p. 2064) argues that "external bene￿ts in-
volve citizen involvement in the community and government, crime reduction,
family decision making and child upbringing, and economic growth. There
is evidence that more schooling does have positive impact in each of these
areas." Examples of other papers which use the per capita level of aggregate
human capital in either the goods or human capital production functions
include Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen, (1990), Tamura (1991) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
The assumption that individual human capital accumulation is an in-
creasing function of both private and public expenditure on education can
nest several models in the literature and re￿ ects the idea that public spend-
ing applies more to primary and secondary education, while private spending
applies more to college education and on-the-job training (see e.g. the dis-
cussion in Blankenau and Simpson, 2004, p. 586). Jones et al. (1997) and
Jones et al. (2005) use private spending only, while the inclusion of public ed-
ucation, ge
t, is consistent with the goal of public education policy in practice,
as well as with previous theoretical work (see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), Blankenau and Simpson (2004), Su (2004) and Blankenau (2005)).
Given the above setup, households act competitively by taking prices,










t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (3)￿(5), the time constraint
4Note that the parameter restrictions employed in (5) imply increasing returns to scale
(IRS) at social level. Lucas (1988) and Benhabib and Perli (1994) are examples of other
studies which employ the IRS assumption in either or both the physical and human capital
production functions. In general, some restrictions on returns to scale are unavoidable to








To produce its homogenous ￿nal product, Y
f
t , each ￿rm, f, uses physical
capital, K
f




















where At is the level of Hick neutral technology available to ￿rms, and 0 <
￿ < 1 is a parameter.
Firms act competitively by taking prices, policy and aggregate outcomes



















2.3 Government budget constraint
Total expenditure on public education, Ge
t and lump-sum transfers/taxes,
Go






















where only two of the three policy instruments, (i.e. Ge
t;Go
t;￿t) can be exoge-
nously set in each t.5 We choose the income tax rate, ￿t, to be the residually
determined policy instrument. Note that, when we calibrate the model, the
inclusion of Go
t will make the residually determined value of the income tax
rate correspond to the rate which exists in the data. This will allow for a
realistic assessment of the trade-o⁄s between increased spending on public
goods versus increased distortions due to higher tax rates.
2.4 Stationary decentralized competitive equilibrium




t=0, and initial conditions






; a decentralized competitive equilibrium
5To focus on public education, we abstract from other common types of government
spending like public investment in infrastructure and utility-enhancing public consump-
tion. Also note that equation (8) is as in e.g. Baxter and King (1993) in the sense that
we use a balanced budget. Ignoring public debt is not important here because lump-sum
taxes/transfers are equivalent to debt ￿nancing in this class of models.




t=0 and the tax rate f￿tg
1
t=0 such that (i) households
maximize utility; (ii) ￿rms maximize pro￿ts; (iii) markets clear; and (iv) the
government budget constraint is satis￿ed in each period. Note that market
clearing values will be denoted without the superscripts h, f.
Since human capital is the engine of long-run endogenous growth, we
transform quantities to make them stationary. We ￿rst de￿ne per capita
quantities for any variable Z as Zt ￿ Zt=Nt, where Zt ￿ (Yt;Ct;Xt;It;Kt;Ht;
Ge
t;Go
t). We next express these quantities as shares of per capita human
capital, e.g. zt ￿ Zt=Ht. Also, the gross human capital growth rate is
de￿ned as ￿t ￿ Ht+1=Ht.
Using this notation and substituting out prices frt;wtg
1
t=0 ;we obtain the
following per capita stationary DCE:6
yt = At (kt)
￿ (ut)
1￿￿ (9)
n￿tkt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
p)kt + ct + xt + g
e
t = yt (10)
n￿t = 1 ￿ ￿
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t = ￿tyt (18)
where ￿t and  t are the transformed shadow prices associated with (3) and
(5) respectively in the household￿ s problem.7
6Note that the model￿ s non-stationary optimality conditions are presented in the Ap-
pendix.
7In particular, ￿t ￿ ￿t=H
￿(1￿￿)￿1
t and  t ￿ ￿t=H
￿(1￿￿)￿1
t where h-superscripts are
omitted.
8Therefore, the stationary DCE is summarized by the above system of ten
equations in the paths of f￿t;yt;ct;xt;ut;et;kt+1;￿t; t;￿tg1
t=0 given the paths




t=0 ; and productivity, fAtg1
t=0;
whose motion is de￿ned in the next subsection.
2.5 Fiscal instruments and technology
We next specify the processes governing the evolution of exogenous ￿scal
policy instruments and technology. We assume that public education spend-
ing as share of output follows a feedback policy rule. This rule consists of
an exogenous component, as well as an endogenous or state-contingent part









where, 0 ￿ ge
0 ￿ 1 is the exogenous constant public education to output share,
zt is an indicator of the current state of the economy, z￿ is the value of this
indicator in the associated social planner￿ s long-run solution8, and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1
is a feedback policy coe¢ cient. Obviously, there are many possible candidates
for zt. For instance, we could choose zt to be any endogenous variable in the
DCE. Given that it is impossible to know a-priori which variable will lead to
the largest e¢ ciency gains, we report below (see Section 4) the rationale for
considering a subset of the model￿ s endogenous variables and the quantitative
welfare implications associated with each.
Consistent with the public economics literature, the motivation for the
state-contingent part of the ￿scal rule is that governmental intervention in
education is primarily justi￿ed by the presence of positive externalities from
the economy￿ s aggregate human capital. In the presence of such externalities,
human capital accumulation is ine¢ ciently low, i.e. zt < z￿, and so the
society steps in to allocate scarce public resources to education to improve
e¢ ciency. If the market and social planner solutions coincide i.e. z￿ = zt,
then no public education spending is required and
ge
t
yt = 0. Finally, a passive
￿scal rule can be depicted as the state when ￿ = 0: In this special case, the
public education spending share is constant and equal to ge
0:
By relating the policy instrument to the observed value of some endoge-
nous variable, we implicitly exploit the information contained in observations
8The social planner￿ s or policy benchmark solution (hereafter SP) is de￿ned to be the
case in which a planner solves the same problem by internalizing externalities. Note that
our quantitative results reported below change very little (i.e. at the fourth decimal place)
when the target value is not the long-run social planner solution, z￿; but the current one,
z￿
t : Hence we use z￿ for simplicity.
9of the endogenous variable in question. In principle, of course, welfare and the
welfare-maximizing value of the feedback policy coe¢ cient are not expected
to be independent of which endogenous variable is chosen as an indicator
or intermediate target, zt (see below). Also, there is no reason to restrict
policy to respond only to one endogenous variable, and not to a combina-
tion of two, or more, or all, endogenous variables, unless observations of that
one variable contain all of the available information relevant to achieving the
policy objective (see the discussion by Friedman (1990) pp. 1210-1212, and
Walsh (2003a), ch.9). Here, we experiment with reacting to one endogenous
variable at a time and compare results across di⁄erent endogenous variables.9
The question of what further role additional endogenous variables can play
is an empirical issue.







where, 0 ￿ go
0 ￿ 1 is ￿xed at a constant share.
Finally, following the RBC literature we assume that technology, At; fol-







where A > 0 is a constant, 0 < ￿a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
"a
t ￿ iid(0;￿2
a) are the random shocks to productivity.
3 Data and Calibration
The model￿ s structural parameters relating to preferences, production and
physical and human capital accumulation are next calibrated using annual
post-war data for the U.S.. As our aim is to use the model to evaluate welfare
as approximated around the steady-state, it is important that the calibrated
parameters imply a sensible long-run solution. This provides the criterion
for choosing those parameters we cannot retrieve from the data or previous
empirical studies, especially the exponents in the production function for
human capital. Our base calibration reported below starts by incorporating
a passive policy rule for government education spending. We then follow
this, in the next section, with an exercise which searches for the values of the
reaction coe¢ cients in (19) which maximize welfare across a variety of active
￿scal rules.
9Note that we also experiment with one period lags of z rather than the current one
but ￿nd that our results are basically una⁄ected. As above, the di⁄erences show up at the
fourth decimal place.
103.1 Data
To calibrate the model, we require data for the endogenous variables as shares
of human capital. Thus it is important to obtain a measure of human cap-
ital that is comparable to monetary valued quantities such as consumption,
income, physical capital and government spending. To obtain this, we use
data from Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, 1992a,b) on human and physical
capital.10 These measures are reported in billions of constant 1982 dollars for
1949-1984. The additional (annual) data required for calibration include out-
put (GDP), consumption, government spending on education, private spend-
ing on education, compensation of employees, GDP de￿ ator, long term nomi-
nal interest rates, labor force, e⁄ective average tax rates on labor and capital
income, hours worked and years of education in the labor force. These are
obtained from the following sources: (i) Bureau of Economic Analysis (NIPA
accounts); (ii) OECD (Economic Outlook database); (iii) U.S. Department
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); (iv) ECFIN E⁄ective Average
Tax Base (see Martinez-Mongay, 2000) and (v) Ho and Jorgenson (2001).
3.2 Calibration
The numeric values for the model￿ s parameters are reported in Table 1 and
the long-run solution they imply is presented in Table 2. To calibrate the
model, we work as follows.
3.2.1 Labour￿ s share, discount rate, leisure and population growth
We set the value of (1 ￿ ￿) equal to labor￿ s share in income (i.e. 0:578) using
compensation of employees data from the OECD Economic Outlook. This
￿gure is similar to others used in the literature, see e.g. Lansing (1998).
Given labour￿ s share, capital￿ s share, ￿, is then determined residually.
The discount rate, 1=￿ is equal to 1 plus the ex-post real interest rate,
where the interest rate data is from the OECD Economic Outlook. This
implies a value 0:964 for ￿. Again this ￿gure is similar to other U.S. studies,
see e.g. King and Rebelo (1999), Lansing (1998) and Perli and Sakellaris
(1998). Following Kydland (1995, ch. 5, p. 134), we set (1 ￿ ￿), the weight
given to leisure relative to consumption in the utility function, equal to the
average value of leisure versus work time for the working population, which is
10As said above, generally empirical studies use measures of school enrolment ratios or
years of schooling as general proxies of labor quality or human capital. However, in our
setup, these proxies are measures of the input to the production function of human capital
(time spent on education) and not of the output of this activity, new human capital.
11obtained using data on hours worked from Ho and Jorgenson (2001).11 This
implies ￿ = 0:36. The population gross growth rate n is set equal to the post




A > 0 0.124 productivity in goods production
B > 0 0.507 productivity in human capital production
0 < ￿ < 1 0.422 productivity of private capital
0 < 1 ￿ ￿ < 1 0.578 productivity of e⁄ective labor
0 < ￿ < 1 0.964 rate of time preference
n ￿ 1 1.016 population growth
0 ￿ ￿
p￿ 1 0.049 depreciation rate on physical capital
0 ￿ ￿
h￿ 1 0.018 depreciation rate on human capital
0 < ge
0 < 1 0.053 public education spending share of output
0 < go
0 < 1 0.157 other public investment spending share of output
￿ > 1 2.000 1=￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
0 < ￿ < 1 0.360 consumption weight in utility
0 ￿ ￿1￿ 1 0.550 productivity of household human capital
0 ￿ ￿2￿ 1 0.050 productivity of private education spending
0 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿1￿￿2￿ 1 0.400 productivity of aggregate human capital
0 ￿ ￿3￿ 1 0.100 productivity of public education spending
0 < ￿ < 1 0.210 e⁄ective direct tax rate
0 < ￿a< 1 0.933 AR(1) parameter technology
￿a> 0 0.010 std. dev. of technology innovations
3.2.2 Depreciation rates, technology and public spending
The depreciation rates for physical, ￿
p, and human capital, ￿
h, are calculated
by Jorgenson and Fraumeni to be, on average, 0:049 and 0:0178, respectively.
We also use a value for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1=￿) that
is common in the DSGE literature (i.e. ￿ = 2). Using a production function
and time period similar to ours, Lansing (1998) provides estimates for TFP.
Hence we use his parameters for the stationary TFP process in (20), e.g.
￿ = 0:933 and ￿a = 0:01.
We also require constants for government education and other government
spending as shares of output. The constant part of education spending ratio
11To obtain this we divide total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure,
following e.g. Ho and Jorgenson (2001). For example, they assume that there are 14 hours
available for work or leisure on a daily basis with the remaining 10 hours accounted for
by physiological needs.
12is set at the data average using NIPA data, i.e. ge
0 = 0:053. We set other
government spending, go
0, in the government budget equation (8) so that
the long-run solution for the tax rate gives 0:21. This value corresponds
to the e⁄ective income tax reported in the ECFIN dataset.12 This implies
go
0 = 0:157 for the output share of other government spending.
3.2.3 Human capital
We next move on to the parameters ￿1, ￿2, ￿3 and B in the production











￿3 in equation (5) is
essentially the production function for the creation of new human capital, or
what Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992a, b) call investment in human capital.
Model consistent values for the scale parameters A and B are obtained by
solving equations (5) and (6) using data averages and long-run values for the
variables y, k, x, u, e, ￿ and ge, as well as the calibrated parameters ￿, ￿1, ￿2,
￿3,n, and ￿
h.13 Data on y, k, x and ￿ are obtained using the NIPA accounts
and the human capital data by Jorgenson and Fraumeni discussed above.
We also acquire a proxy for e and u to calibrate A and B by employing
data on the allocation of time in the labor force in education, work and leisure.
Using data on hours worked from Ho and Jorgenson (2001) (see above), we
calculate the share of leisure time to be 0:64. We assume that, on average,
agents have the same leisure versus non-leisure time allocation independent
of whether non-leisure time is used to create human capital or to work. This
implies that in the steady state, non-leisure time (i.e. e+u) should be equal
to 0:36. Agents spend time to educate both in formal education and in on-the
job learning. Private agents allocate approximately 30% of their non-leisure
time to formal education as opposed to work (assuming an average of 14
years spent on education and 35 years in work). In addition, they spend
time to improve their human capital while at work, in the form of on-the
job-training. According to the 1976 SRC Time Use Data (see e.g. Kim and
Lee, 2007), this amounts to 20% of their work time. Taken together, these
imply that on average, 35% of the labor force spends its non-leisure time in
human capital creation. Given the clear upward trend in the education data,
we might expect this ￿gure to increase in the future and treat this as a lower
bound for our steady state results. In any case, for the purpose of calibrating
A and B we set e and u to 0:126 and 0:234 respectively.
12We calculate this as the weighted average of the e⁄ective tax rates on (gross) capital
income and labor income, where the weights are capital￿ s and labor￿ s shares in income.
13For this exercise, we obtain model consistent y, from equation (3), using NIPA data.
13Given the functions for the calibration of A and B, we calibrate ￿1, ￿2
and ￿3 so that we obtain an economically meaningful and data-consistent
long-run solution. In particular, we choose the three parameters so that the
long-run solution for education time, e, growth, ￿ and private spending on
education as a share of GDP, x=y, are close to the data. This can be obtained
by setting values of ￿1 = 0:55, ￿2 = 0:05 and ￿3 = 0:1.
It is also important to note the following regarding the calibrated values
of ￿1, ￿2 and ￿3. For higher (lower) values of ￿2, the steady state x=y solution
becomes higher (lower). The value ￿2 = 0:05 implies that private education
spending as a share of GDP is close to the data average (about 2%). More-
over, for higher externalities, the growth rate becomes too low, irrespective
of the size of ￿3. This happens because, with very high externalities, there
are free riding problems in the creation of human capital. On the other hand,
for low externalities, the implied share of time allocated to education (e) in
the long-run becomes unrealistically large. By contrast, our calibrated values
￿1 = 0:55 and ￿3 = 0:1. guarantee a growth rate consistent with the data
average (2%)14 and, at the same time, imply that agents in the long-run will
spend about 50% of their non-leisure time in acquiring human capital.
3.2.4 Long-run solution
The steady-state solution implied by this calibration is reported in Table 2.
As can be seen, the long-run solution is close to the data average for the U.S.,
(see e.g. King and Rebello, 1999). Concerning the allocation of time, the
model￿ s long-run solution implies that total leisure time in the labour force
is 62:9% (see also above). In addition, the model solution indicates that
education e⁄ort in the long run is about 50% of the labor force non-leisure
time. As discussed above, this is consistent with increased education and
training activities in the U.S. labor force.
To sum up, this model economy for the post-war U.S. is consistent with
externalities in private human accumulation and productive public education
expenditure. Lucas (1988) supports a value of human capital externality of
0:4, but (since his externality is modeled as a direct argument in the goods
production function) its e⁄ect on output produced is much higher relative to
our calibrated externality. The associated value of the productivity of public
education expenditure, ￿3 = 0:1, is also well within the range assumed in the
14Note that a value of the gross growth rate of 1:02 is the US per labour input growth
rate for 1949-1984 using GDP data from the NIPA accounts and labour data from Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
14related literature (see e.g. Blankenau (2005) p. 501).










Recall that the raison d￿ etre for government in our simple setup is that ex-
ternalities in human capital accumulation result in suboptimally low human
capital accumulation in DCE. Hence, we ￿nd it natural to start by choosing
the growth rate of human capital, ￿t, as the indicator variable zt in our ￿scal
policy reaction function (19). Thus, the authorities react to the gap between
the market value of ￿t and its social planner value, ￿￿ (we call this the ￿ gap
rule). Other natural candidates for zt include the returns to education as
perceived by the household in DCE, as these returns determine the resources
that individuals allocate to human capital. Thus, we will also explore the
quantitative implications of reacting to the gap between the shadow price of
human capital ( t) and its social planner value, as well as the gap between
the wage rate (wt) and its social planner value. Finally, for reasons of com-
parability with the stabilization literature that looks at output, we will also
consider reaction to the output growth,
yt
yt￿1; gap (see, e.g. Walsh (2003b)).15
We will compute welfare under each of the alternative policy rules (e.g.
alternative indicator variables, zt) in (19)). Welfare is de￿ned as the condi-
tional expectation of the discounted sum of lifetime utility. We will approx-
imate both the equilibrium solution and welfare to second-order around the
non-stochastic steady state (see e.g. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004, 2007)).
Note that, in contrast to solutions which impose certainty equivalence, the
solution of the second-order system allows us to take account of the uncer-
tainty agents face when making decisions. Also note, as pointed out by e.g.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-GrohØ and
15Note that in the steady state, output growth is equal to the human capital growth,
so this target is fully compatible with the above reasoning for human capital growth.
Obviously, along the transition path the two targets will have di⁄erent welfare implications.
15Uribe (2004), the second-order approximation to the model￿ s policy function
helps to avoid potential spurious welfare rankings of di⁄erent regimes that
may arise under certainty equivalence.16 Further, the welfare gains/losses,
associated with alternative policy rules, denoted as ￿, will be obtained by
computing the percentage compensation in private consumption that the in-
dividual would require so as to be equally well o⁄between two policy rules.17
4.1 Optimal resource allocation and net welfare
In this subsection, we start our analysis by computing welfare, and the as-
sociated welfare-maximizing value of the feedback policy coe¢ cient, ￿; for
alternative indicators used as zt in the policy rule (19) (see 4.1.1.). We then
study the di⁄erences between active and passive policy as TFP uncertainty
rises and we do so for each policy rule (see 4.1.2). Finally, we present further
results regarding, according to our analysis, the best available policy rule
(see 4.1.3).
4.1.1 Welfare under di⁄erent indicators
Using the baseline parameters in Table 1 above, we compute welfare for a
wide range of feedback policy coe¢ cients, ￿, under each feedback rule. This
allows us to ￿nd the welfare-maximizing value of ￿ under each rule. The
four diagrams in Figure 1 plot the welfare associated with di⁄erent values of
￿ when the government reacts to the gaps of ￿t,  t; wt and
yt
yt￿1 from their
respective social planner values. The ￿gure shows that the optimal ￿ values
are 0.16, 4.5, 0.1 and 0.13 respectively. It also shows that, at the optimum,
the level of welfare associated with each active rule is approximately the same
(however see below). It ￿nally shows that this value is clearly higher than
the corresponding value under the passive rule (which happens when we set
￿ = 0 in each case) at least at the baseline calibrated level of uncertainty
(however see below).
16See the Appendix for further details on the derivation of welfare. Also note that we
evaluate the conditional expectation in the welfare function using Monte-Carlo integration.
To this end we conduct 1000 simulations and approximate an agent￿ s in￿nite life-time by
300 years since ￿
300 ’ 0; where ￿ =0.933.
17Our derivation of ￿ in the Appendix follows Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992)






























174.1.2 Passive versus active policy and uncertainty
We now compute the welfare gains/losses associated with active relative to
passive policy, for each of the four indicators (￿t,  t; wt and
yt
yt￿1 ) discussed
above, across a varying degree of macroeconomic uncertainty. By welfare un-
der active policy, we mean the maximum welfare resulting from the optimally
chosen ￿ in (19). By passive, we mean the case where the government￿ s pub-
lic education share in output is held constant at its data average (i.e. when
we set ￿ = 0 in equation (19)).
Table 3 summarizes the welfare gains/losses (i.e. the value of ￿) of active
relative to passive policy across di⁄erent values of the standard deviation
of TFP, ￿a. In particular, we present results for the deterministic case (i.e.
￿a = 0), the base calibration case where ￿a = 0:01 (which was also the case in
Figure 1), and for two more scenarios representing higher levels of uncertainty
which might reasonably be observable in practice, i.e. ￿a = f0:03; 0:06g.
Table 3: Optimal rules and welfare gains/losses from active policy
￿ gap   gap w gap ￿y gap
￿a = 0 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
￿a = 0:01 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010
￿a = 0:03 0.012 0.006 0.010 -0.001
￿a = 0:06 0.013 -0.013 0.007 -0.079
To interpret the ￿ndings in Table 3, it is important to note that wel-
fare gains/losses from active policy can be attributed to both resource re-
allocation and stabilization e⁄ects. The latter are obviously absent in a
deterministic environment where the economy is at its steady state.
In a deterministic environment, ￿a = 0, active policy is used for resource
allocation only. Since all endogenous variables, used as policy indicators in
(19), are obtained from the solution of the same problem (i.e. the DCE for
z and the SP for z￿), the particular choice of z makes no di⁄erence to the
extent that active policies (namely, the feedback policy coe¢ cients, ￿) are
chosen optimally. Hence, all indicators imply the same welfare gain relative
to passive policy (as reported in row 2 of Table 3, when ￿a = 0, applying any
of the active rules leads to welfare gains of 1.1%). Therefore, to the extent
that ￿scal reaction is optimally chosen, and there is no uncertainty, the choice
of the endogenous variable serving as a policy indicator, that the authorities
react to, does not matter to welfare. In other words, in a deterministic
environment, all endogenous variables are equally good as indicators of the
market ine¢ ciency.
18By contrast, in a stochastic environment, ￿a > 0, active rules might also
yield bene￿ts/costs from a stabilization perspective. A higher value of ￿ in
rows 3-5 in Table 3, relative to the value reported in row 1, indicates the extra
bene￿ts associated with a particular optimal active rule￿ s ability to smooth
the economy along the transition path. A negative value of ￿ indicates that
active policy is destabilizing relative to passive policy. The results in Table
3 suggest that the potential gains and losses associated with active versus
passive policy rules contain a strong degree of asymmetry. For example, only
when we use the ￿ gap rule, the higher the uncertainty, the stronger the scope
for using active policy (although the extra gains are small). In contrast, when
we use the remaining gaps, as uncertainty increases, the desirability of active
policy decreases, especially when we use the   gap and the
yt
yt￿1 gap rules.
Therefore, in a stochastic world, the choice of the endogenous variable
used as an indicator, that policymakers react to, does matter to the macro-
economy. The same results suggest that, for relatively high uncertainty, some
forms of active policy can even become counter-productive vis-a-vis passive
policy (￿ < 0). This happens because action always comes at a cost (here,
changes in public education spending trigger changes in distorting income
taxes). Hence, excessive action destabilizes the economy.18 Only, when we
react to the gap between the market value of the growth rate of human cap-
ital and its social planner value, the attractiveness of active versus passive
policy is increasing in the degree of overall uncertainty (at least in the empir-
ically plausible range of standard deviations reported in Table 3). Therefore,
reaction to the ￿ gap is superior to reaction to all other gaps in terms of
welfare. This happens because the growth rate of human capital is the en-
gine of perpetual growth and hence the key determinant of welfare. To put
it di⁄erently, the growth rate of human capital is at the heart of the market
imperfection, or - strictly speaking - closer to that than any other indicator,
so that reaction to this gap is the most e¢ cient way of policy action.
18In general, the macro e⁄ects of ￿scal policy and government size are not monotonic
to the magnitude and type of shocks. For a rich survey, see the European Commission￿ s




























































204.1.3 Gains from the ￿ gap rule
To obtain a fuller picture of these relationships, we next plot in Figure 2
(above) the welfare gains associated with reacting to the ￿ gap rule relative
to passive policy as well as the other active rules. Again this is carried
out for di⁄erent levels of uncertainty. The results suggest that the relative
welfare bene￿ts of following the human capital growth rate rule are highest
when the alternative is the output growth rate rule. In this case, the relative
gains can be nearly 10% at high levels of uncertainty. The rank-ordering
from highest to lowest for the remaining rules is that reacting to the shadow
price of human capital gap is second; and this is followed by being passive
and by reacting to the wage gap respectively. For example, at high levels
of uncertainty, these rules suggest relative welfare gains of 2.5%, 1.28% and
0.006%. Thus, it appears that the ￿ gap rule outperforms the competitors
considered when the focus is varying degrees of uncertainty.
To further explore what is driving the above results, we next examine the
impulse response (IR) functions of the three ￿rst-moment arguments in the
welfare function, i.e. the growth rate (￿), leisure (l) and consumption (c),
for all policy rules, in response to a 1% standard deviation shock to TFP.
The IRs are presented in the Appendix. As can be seen in these Figures,
the advantage of the ￿ gap rule o⁄ steady-state is that the path of human
capital growth (￿) is relatively smoother than the competing rules.19 The
other rules involve trade-o⁄s, as they result in making some series smoother,
while increasing the volatility in others. Hence, their overall second-order
result on welfare is not clear and, as we saw above, depends on the level
of uncertainty. Regarding the output growth rule, in addition to making
consumption more volatile, notice that the e⁄ect of this rule is that human
capital growth (￿) becomes countercyclical for the ￿rst periods after the
shock.
Therefore, the ￿ gap rule implies additional bene￿ts over the business
cycle, when compared to the other active rules, as it makes the growth rate
in the economy more stable. Although the other active rules improve the
resource allocation in the deterministic long run, they e⁄ectively de-stabilize
the economy along the transition path. The general message is that the
human capital growth rule is preferred.
An interesting implication of the ￿ gap rule is that it suggests that gov-
19Note from the second order approximation to the welfare function (see the Appendix)
that, in addition to the steady state values of ￿,l,c and the deviations of ￿t,lt,ct from
their steady state values, what also matters for welfare is the squared deviations and cross
products of ￿t,lt,ct from their steady state values. Hence the variance of the series and
their covariances are also important in determining the level of welfare.
21ernments should increase the output share of public education spending in
bad times (and decrease it in good times). This is opposite to the policy
implication obtained from the passive rule case. In the passive rule case,
when a negative shock hits the economy, so that output falls, the govern-
ment should also decrease the level of public spending on education to keep
its output share (and thus the tax rate) constant. On the contrary, according
to the ￿ gap rule, when a negative shock hits the economy, the government
should increase education spending as a share in GDP. The reason is that
after a negative shock, the growth rate of human capital falls further below
the target, so that the government should spend more on education to sup-
port human capital accumulation, which is the engine of growth. As we have
seen, such countercyclical policy implies welfare gains because it smooths
human capital growth. Notice also that these gains are realized here even if
the government has to raise the income tax to ￿nance the extra spending. In
other words, in this model, countercyclical spending on public education is
welfare improving, even if it requires increases in distorting tax rates in bad
times.
4.2 Welfare gains over time
We next examine the welfare gains over time, when following di⁄erent policy
rules, by evaluating welfare in varying time periods after a temporary TFP
shock for a low level of uncertainty, i.e. ￿a = 0:01.20 In Table 4, we employ
time horizons of 5, 10 and 20 years after the temporary shock hits the econ-
omy and report welfare in each case. In addition, we report the welfare gains
from using an active rule versus a passive rule for all types of active policy
and all time horizons. Finally, we report the welfare gains from using the ￿
gap rule as opposed to the other (active and passive) rules for all these time
horizons.
There are a number of interesting results to be observed in Table 4. The
￿rst pattern observed is that all active rules imply welfare gains over the
passive rule for all time horizons. Hence, for low levels of uncertainty, the
active rules are preferable, not only by a lifetime utility criterion, but also
when the interest is in shorter term bene￿ts. Notice that, for all rules, the
welfare gains versus passive policy settle down to 1% to 1:2% in the long
run, as expected given our previous evaluations in Table 3. Another useful
observation, consistent with the ￿ndings in Table 3, is that the human capital
growth rule outperforms the other rules, with implied welfare gains in the
20This is in e⁄ect the average in the US data and is consistent with the value used in
most studies in the literature.
22range 0:1% to 0:8%. Notice that, in the long run, when the e⁄ects of the
shock have faded away, all active rules give rise to the same level of welfare.
Again, given the evaluations in Table 3, this is as expected since all active
rules imply the same resource allocation in the steady state.
Table 4: E⁄ects of a temporary TFP shock
Welfare
Years passive ￿ gap   gap w gap ￿y gap
5 -26.92 -26.30 -26.36 -26.31 -26.35
10 -54.54 -53.40 -53.52 -53.42 -53.55
20 -94.55 -92.90 -93.06 -92.93 -93.12
1 -167.34 -166.66 -166.62 -166.67 -166.63
Gains relative to passive
Years passive ￿ gap   gap w gap ￿y gap
5 0 0.065 0.058 0.064 0.059
10 0 0.059 0.052 0.058 0.051
20 0 0.049 0.044 0.048 0.042
1 0 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.012
Gains relative to ￿ gap
Years passive ￿ gap   gap w gap ￿y gap
5 0.065 0 0.006 0.001 0.005
10 0.059 0 0.006 0.001 0.008
20 0.049 0 0.005 0.001 0.007
1 0.011 0 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
4.3 Welfare gains for the U.S. (1981-2004)
Since the ￿ gap rule appears to perform the best over the criteria set out
in Tables 3 and 4, we next illustrate the potential welfare gains that can
be obtained by following this rule when we use actual data. For example,
we feed the model with actual TFP growth shocks21 and calculate welfare
under the passive rule and the ￿ gap rule for the U.S., over the whole period
1981-2004 as well as over selected sub-periods.
The results in Table 5 suggest that quite substantial welfare gains could
have been realized over the various periods considered. Considering that
the model only has one (non-internalised) market imperfection, these gains
21Note that the TFP growth shocks have been calculated using annual data from the
Gronigen project (see www.ggdc.net/index-dseries.html).
23appear to be quite signi￿cant.
Table 5: Welfare under actual TFP shocks (1981-2004)
Years passive ￿ gap welfare gain
1981-1985 -26.94 -26.32 0.065
1981-1990 -54.39 -53.26 0.058
1991-2004 -72.26 -70.88 0.054
1981-2004 -105.07 -103.39 0.045
However, in our present work, (i) the government reacts to a measure
of resource misallocation rather than a measure of cyclical conditions as in
the stabilization literature (ii) we use an endogenous growth model where
the engine of long-term growth is human capital accumulation (iii) ￿scal
reaction is most bene￿cial when the policymakers relate their ￿scal stance
to the human capital growth indicator, which is the indicator closest to the
underlying misallocation problem. In other words, our (second-best) policy
message is: do react to a market imperfection, but do so as directly as possible
by relating the policy instrument to an indicator close to that imperfection.22
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have quantitatively assessed the welfare implications of
alternative public education spending rules. To achieve this, we employed
a DSGE model in which human capital externalities and public education
expenditures, ￿nanced by distorting taxes, enhance the productivity of pri-
vate education choices. We allowed public education spending, as share of
output, to respond to various aggregate indicators in an attempt to minimize
the market imperfection due to human capital externalities. We also exposed
the economy to varying degrees of uncertainty via changes in the variance of
total factor productivity shocks. Our results indicated that, in the face of
increasing aggregate uncertainty, active policy can signi￿cantly outperform
passive policy but only when the policy instrument is successful in smoothing
the growth rate of human capital.
Despite establishing that it is possible to design simple ￿scal resource
allocation rules which can signi￿cantly improve welfare, much more research
22Contrary to traditional ad hoc macroeconomic models, recent micro-founded general
equilibrium studies imply that the potential gains from active stabilization policy may be
limited (see, e.g. Beetsma (2008) for a review of this literature, Malley et al. (2008), and
Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2007)). In contrast, in this paper the government￿ s goal is to
improve resource allocation not to smooth ￿ uctuations so that any stabilizing e⁄ects occur
as a by-product of more e¢ cient resource allocation.
24is needed to make these implementable in practice. This will require continual
improvement in the measurement of human capital but also most probably
the econometric estimation of models and ￿scal rules along the lines of the
ones developed in this paper. We leave these extensions for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Non-stationary optimality conditions
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t are the multipliers associated with (3) and (5) respectively.























Using the notation set out in the paper, ￿rst consider the per capita repre-










where Ht is the beginning-of-period human capital stock. Since ￿t ￿ Ht+1=Ht;








and H0 is given from initial conditions.





















for t = 0. (34)
6.2.2 Steady-state utility
We de￿ne the long-run as the state without stochastic shocks and constant







where the * superscript denotes steady-state per capita utility. In the steady-
state, non-stationary Ct grows at the constant rate ￿, which in turn implies
for ￿;￿ > 1 that the growth of U
￿
t is constant and less than unity.
296.2.3 Second-order approximation of within period utility






, so that the second-order


















t+[Uzlzl]b ztb lt (36)
where
b zt = b ct +
Pt￿1
s=0 b ￿s;


















































































The expression in (36) gives the second-order approximation, U
s
t; for any
t ￿ 1: Therefore at t = 0 , the expression for U
s
t is the same except that
z0 ￿ c0.
6.2.4 Second-order approximation of lifetime utility















In the simulations, lifetime is approximated by T = 300 years and the sample
average for V is calculated using 1000 simulations.
306.2.5 Welfare comparison of two regimes
Say there are two regimes denoted by the superscripts A and B: Then, fol-
lowing e.g. Lucas (1990), we de￿ne ￿ as the constant fraction of regime B￿ s
consumption supplement that the household would be willing to give up to
be as well o⁄ under A as under B. Hence, we write:
V
A




Solving for ￿; we obtain:






















t and V A
t are calculated by using the second-order approximation
of welfare as de￿ned in (37) above and averaged over 1000 simulations.
6.3 Social planner￿ s solution
This is de￿ned to be the case in which human capital externalities are in-
ternalized. Since, in this model, taxes are used to ￿nance public education
spending, where the latter is not required in the absence of human capital
externalities, we drop public education spending and set taxes at zero.
Hence the planner maximizes (we omit h and f superscripts denoting












Ct + Xt + It = At (Kt)
￿ (utHt)
1￿￿ (41)
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿
p)Kt + It (42)





as well as, the time constraint lt + ut + et = 1 and initial conditions for K0
and H0.
Working as in the DCE; we obtain a new per capita stationary equilib-
rium in nine equations and nine variables f￿t;yt;ct;xt;ut;et;kt+1;￿t; tg1
t=0.
yt = At (kt)
￿ (ut)
1￿￿ (44)
31n￿tkt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
p)kt + ct + xt = yt (45)
n￿t = 1 ￿ ￿
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